by Denis Combet and Constance Cartmill
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The significance of the 1782 expedition to Hudson Bay under the command of the French naval officer Jean-Francois Galaup, Comte de Lapérouse is instructive in several ways. Undertaken during the last part of the American War of Independence (1778-1783), the destruction of Prince of Wales Fort at the mouth of the Churchill River, as well as York Factory further south along the coast, stirred English public opinion and cost the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) millions of pounds, while the spoils brought three million francs to the French. [1] The attack can probably be linked to the reorganization of the HBC after 1783, when the London merchants relinquished their hold on Prince of Wales Fort.
French naval officer Jean-Francois Galaup, Comte de Laperouse whose 1780 plan for an attack on Hudson's Bay Company posts was initially rejected by the French Ministry of the Navy. Two years later, however, Laperouse lead an expedition to Hudson Bay, attacking and destroying both Prince of Wales Fort and York Factory.
Source: Library and Archives Canada, C-1349.
Beyond its political and economic results, this military success allowed the French to regain knowledge of a region of which they had lost sight since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Given the geographical and scientific outcome, the Lapérouse expedition constituted both the end result of French enterprises undertaken toward the North and South Poles since the beginning of the modern era, and the starting point for establishing precise knowledge of regions that were to be explored in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. [2] From this viewpoint, then, the expedition to Hudson Bay can be considered a test for the voyage of discovery around the world that was to take place in 1785, for it demonstrated to the authorities of the French Court, not only Lapérouse's military skills but also his abilities as a navigator. [3] The waters of Hudson Bay, often ice-covered, had made navigation especially difficult, even perilous. But what also persuaded Louis XVI to give command of the voyage of circumnavigation to Lapérouse was the latter's organizational skills, and the care he took to protect his sailors from scurvy, following the example of the great British navigator, Captain James Cook.
Leadership of the attack on Hudson Bay had been coveted by many an officer of the Marine who would have loved to achieve the glory of succeeding in such an ambitious military operation. [4] The text, translated and published here for the first time, is an early plan which Lapérouse revealed to his friend, Charles-Pierre Claret de Fleurieu who was in charge of ports and arsenals in the Ministry of the French Navy. [5] This plan from 1780 was found in the Archives Nationales, Marine, in Paris. Although the plan was not retained, given the heavy costs entailed and the lack of interest by the French at that time in re-conquering that part of North America, it remains interesting in many ways. (Despite their earlier reservations, a new plan for an attack on the HBC posts of western Hudson Bay was developed by the French navy on short notice late the following year and was much less detailed than the document below.)
For Lapérouse, who in 1757 had taken up arms for the first time in Canada, and in Newfoundland in 1763, [6] it was definitely a question of recapturing territory in order remain competitive with the English. In addition, if this plan confirms for us the lack of information possessed by the French on the quality of the Hudson Bay Company's defences of its forts, it also provides an overview of Lapérouse's eventual strategy for the 1782 attack. Undoubtedly somewhat unrealistic at the time it was drawn up, Lapérouse's early plan nonetheless confirms the ambitious and well-thought-out vision which he had already demonstrated on several occasions during the campaigns in which he had participated. This natural ability for achieving greatness did not go unnoticed by his superiors, especially Louis XVI.
An English company operates a lucrative fur trade in Hudson Bay; a hundred men spread out between four forts in bad repair, or rather four trading posts armed with a few cannons, receive animal skins from the Eskimos, which they have obtained from hunting. In exchange they are given brandy, rifles, powder, a few course cloths and some dry goods of little value.
This company, formed under the specious pretext of facilitating the means to find the much-desired passage from the Atlantic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, receives remarkable protection. Its privileges extend over the entire fur trade from the shores of Labrador and Newfoundland; the care it has taken to remove all potential competitors from these vast regions, has concentrated the entire fur trade in its warehouse and principally in Fort York; and the Indians, accustomed to going there, rarely turn away.
This practice assures for the owners of the shores in question a part of the trade that is lucrative and steadily consistent; therefore it is not the momentary capture that should lead us there, but the certainty of establishing a trade which we have been utterly lacking since the loss of Canada. It would even be possible to gain other advantages, which we shall examine once we have proposed the most suitable means for securing the success of an armament destined for this raid. Since it would combine a trade plan with a military action, we believe we must address each one separately in order to better develop our ideas.
A frigate of 21 or 26 battery cannons, and 2 cutters of 16 to 18 cannons, but constructed solidly and in such a way as to withstand the seas that will have to be crossed, with one hundred or one hundred and fifty soldiers, would constitute sufficient forces to capture the forts of Hudson Bay and the ships which go there regularly each year to bring the merchandise that the company distributes to the Indians and to bring back the furs: but since the location and climate may create obstacles, it is appropriate to takes measures against the ones that can be tolerated.
Although the forts or fortified trading posts of Hudson Bay are poorly armed and only have poor defences, their position could be such that the weakest garrison, assured that the rigours of the season will force the enemy to retreat, can put up a stubborn resistance. Moreover, however weak the garrisons of these forts may be ordinarily, they could be reinforced by the crews of the company's vessels, if they arrive before the enemy. Finally, these forts are generally located at considerable distances and situated on rivers that did not allow our frigates to attack them, nor to protect troops landing on the beaches in the vicinity.
The position of these forts could make a raid difficult but one must agree that they cannot withstand the cannon, if the elevation or their distance from the moorings prevents the vessels' artillery from destroying their defences. A few gun carriages shipped for field artillery will enable the placement of batteries on land, if the need arises. In addition, two or three short artillery pieces will quickly capture those so-called forts, which certainly have neither a vault, a blockhouse nor any protection from the cannon blast. By this means, it may not be necessary to unload a cannon, nor to establish batteries, which would accelerate an expedition in which each second would be precious. These short artillery pieces would become an even greater resource for the defence of posts where we could take up position, especially if they overlook the sea, since no vessel is safe from the cannon blast. In any case this kind of artillery will therefore be essential.
Regarding the landing, if the frigates tow too much water to enter the havens or the rivers on which the forts may be located, the cutters will at least reach the moorage of these ships of the English company, which ordinarily weigh three hundred tons: they will be strong enough to remove them, in order to protect the landing.
Admittedly, it is possible that the short space of time employed for such an expedition will not allow us to capture the four forts in the same campaign, especially if they are located at great distances from one another: however, one may presume that as soon as we are masters of the York forts, which are the most noteworthy, the others will surrender at the first warning signal, which could be given to them by the cutters and the smallest detachment; for these forts are constructed to intimidate the Indians, rather than to resist European forces. Indeed, what is a post guarded by fifteen or twenty men?
In addition, if the company's vessels are taken, will it not be necessary for these posts to surrender, since they will be deprived of the help needed to subsist as much as to continue their trade with the Indians.
Finally, if in the first campaign we are masters of the main post, while leaving behind the slightest of forces, it is certain that they would take control of the rest.
But to pursue the objections even further, let us suppose the Hudson Bay forces impregnable against the forces we would have brought there; there would always remain one resource, that of the Canadians at the end of the last century: too weak to attack the English in their posts, they limited themselves to establishing a post from which they competed with them for the fur trade, and in which they held out, in spite of continual hostilities, up until the treaty of Utrecht which ensures Great Britain the possession of Hudson Bay and of its trade: and so, if we do not succeed in taking control of a lucrative trade which we lack, we can at least put ourselves in the position of sharing it with England; and if that power wanted to chase us away from the post that we would be forced to establish in that harsh climate, she would at least be obliged to use actual forces; and any means of diversion which would not keep us occupied with war ships can only be to our advantage.
Establishing the colony in Hudson Bay undoubtedly requires as much attention as the military armament intended to achieve it. One cannot abandon men at the edge of the habitable world, without giving them the means to survive; they must be given the tools to resist the cold and famine, and the means to cultivate the friendship of the Indians, which would be of great help to them.
These precautions require shipping a large quantity of salt and supplies to them, mainly bread and wheat; with the help of the Indians, fishing and hunting can provide them with abundant food; there, brandy becomes a necessary beverage, and can supplement the wine which would be needed in too great a quantity. Besides, it is absolutely necessary to give some to the Indians, but it has to be distributed to them with caution, for the drunkenness it procures them makes them dangerous and ferocious.
The country provides clothing suitable for the climate; in spite of this, prudence requires that some cloths be supplied, in case there is a shortage of furs in the first year. Wood is rare in all of Hudson Bay; in truth, one finds coal there; but the mines could be far from the settlements of our colonists; therefore it would be advisable to bring some from Europe, and some stoves to burn it; it would also be necessary to transport timber and planks in order to expand or re-establish the dwellings of the forts which we would have taken, or else build new ones.
But how does one embark on a frigate already encumbered with its crews and troops, and cutters loaded, as it were, with the ballast necessary to keep their sails running? It would be imperative, therefore, to add a store ship or a merchant ship, the best sailboat possible, and which could carry at least two hundred and fifty tons, apart from its supplies: we would load this ship with the foodstuffs and effects which we have just mentioned, and the men needed to establish a post in Hudson Bay. That way, the two objectives of the expedition would be met and its success would be assured. But what kind of men would be suitable for founding the colony? How and for whom should it be administered, and finally, what would be its usefulness?
The unfortunate inhabitants of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon Islands, ruined, driven out by the English from the poor settlements they had built there, accustomed to the harsh climate, the frugal and laborious life, the dangers to which they were exposed daily on stormy seas, in a word, all the miseries, all the calamities brought on by hopes of a slight fortune, these are the men whom fate seems to offer to establish the settlement described in this memoir.
Aside from the fur trade which we have discussed, the settlers of this sort could profit from the whale hunt in the bay, or rather in the Hudson Sea; they would not fail to engage in such an endeavour, if the government or merchants, to whom trading privileges for that bay could be granted, supplied them with the ships and gear they would need. This hunt, which must be extremely abundant there, would not fail to attract new settlers to the establishments in the vicinity, because they would not require the expense of a sizable armament; it would be lucrative, and besides, the proximity of their settlements would allow them to melt the fats on land and to produce their oils there; they would be in a position to make the most of their hunting.
Apart from the oils which are in great demand and the barbs whose use is generally well-known, the whale produces a substance used to make candles, which can replace the ones made of wax: nothing would prevent the settlers from refining it, which would occupy them during the long winters that force the inhabitants of these frozen regions to remain in a continuous state of inactivity, shut away in their dwellings for several months. Some sort of occupation would be all the more useful to them, given that this inactivity is often harmful, since it is the leading cause of scurvy and other diseases which are the result of a long period of rest preceded or followed by a more strenuous kind of life full of hardships. The establishment of such a manufacture would require spacious and convenient lodgings that can only be the work of the government or the company we mentioned. It is certain that a company of intelligent merchants will profit greatly from an enterprise that would become costly for the king if he retained control of it in his hands.
From this principle, the validity of which has been only too often recognized, it follows that His Majesty will be willing to grant trade privileges for Hudson Bay to the merchants whom he will deign to allow to participate in the conquest of the weak English posts that now control it. Then this company would supply the settlers with the goods necessary for trading with the Indians, the ships and utensils needed for their fishing, their supplies, their lodgings, in a word, everything they could find necessary: it would receive as payment the yield from their fishing and trading, and anything beyond what is owed them for the settlers should be regulated by a treaty passed under the watch of the minister, who will see to it that the settlers are provided with the means to make their fortune, as they deserve, and that the company receives the profits which could encourage it to expand its trade: in this way, the posts it will have established will benefit from the advantages that a rich and wise society could obtain for them, without having to worry about the tyranny of a monopoly.
One easily surmises that the administration and the defence of the posts in question should be entrusted to this company: and so, after the first expedition, the government will incur no expense, and the state will benefit from these advantages procured for them by this new trade branch, without bearing any of the costs.
We shall not discuss the potential importance and the usefulness of the Hudson Bay posts, if the presumed passage from this bay to the South Sea were finally established; in spite of appearances, this passage may be a chimera, or may exist without being passable.
The project that occupies us is not based on any kind of illusion; we shall conclude by indicating the actual resources we may have, if unforeseen events resulted in the failure of our attacks on Hudson Bay, and those that could lessen the danger of this enterprise.
The greatest danger in this plan is being attacked during the crossing, or being seen and pursued in the southern regions where the plan is to be carried out.
In order to lessen the danger considerably, especially if the expedition takes place in a port of la Manche, it would be advisable to take the North Sea route, to come abreast of the Island or at least the iron islands, from which we would cross over in a few days, by heading directly for the Hudson Strait. One would hope to obtain guides for this strait and for the bay: New England could provide some, for not only does it engage in the whale hunt there, but it is also still seriously engaged in finding the South Sea passage, which would suggest searches requiring a great knowledge of this area.
If the project for the Hudson Bay cannot be carried out, the frigate and the cutters could ravage their coast of Newfoundland, and even attack St. John, if the English neglect to have forces there in the next campaign, which one must presume since they have neither enemies, nor any expedition planned in those waters. The latter raid could reap huge benefits and cause more harm to the enemy than the first. It would easily be all the more successful for not being foreseen. Finally, if it is still impassable, if the island of Newfoundland is closely guarded, there is still the possibility of an advantageous voyage to the opening of the St. Lawrence near the end of September, for that is the time when all the merchant ships heading for Canada return. The frigate could send whatever it seizes to Europe or to Boston, and it could obtain large spoils.
As for the vessel which would be loaded with the men and supplies sent to establish the colony, it should sail for Boston or Delaware, where its cargo would certainly be sold, mainly consisting of salt and brandy, which are the items most sought after by the Americans. These cloths and dry goods would also have an advantageous outlet, since those colonies trade the same items with their Indians. In a word, only the timber would become useless, and that is of little concern.
- The posts of the English company in Hudson Bay can be taken out by middling forces.
- And to form a colony there with the inhabitants of St. Pierre and Miquelon.
- This colony could engage in the whale hunt and form a manufacture, with resulting benefits for the Royal Marine.
- The dangers of this expedition would be lessened considerably, by having the loaded frigates set their course for the Northern Seas.
- If the forts cannot be taken out, we could at least establish a post which would enable us to compete with the English for the fur trade.
- If the enterprise on Hudson Bay fails, attacks could be made on the island of Newfoundland, which presumably would succeed.
- If it becomes impossible, as a last resort, a worthwhile voyage could be made to the opening of the St. Lawrence River.
- Finally, the merchandise and their effects, originally intended for Hudson Bay, could be sold for a profit in Boston or Philadelphia.
These are the principle goals contained and discussed in this memoir. The administration could resolve to carry out the project there outlined, as it will not be any more expensive, and could procure greater advantages than the voyages for which it could employ the necessary forces.
1. Philippe Bonnichon, “Introduction”, in Pierre-Bruno-Jean de La Monneraye, Souvenirs de 1760 a 1791, Édité pour la Société de l'Histoire de France, par Philippe Bonnichon, Paris, Honoré Champion, 1998, p. 57.
4. Surcouf the Elder wrote a letter to the Minister of Marine, the marquis De Castries at the end of 1781, asking him for the honour of conducting a raid on Hudson Bay (Archives Nationales, Marine, B4, 191).
5. Archives Nationales, Marine, B4, 183, folios, 111 - 129.
6. Michel Vergé-Franceschi, La Marine Française au XVIIIe siècle, Les Espaces Maritimes, Sedes, 1996, p. 322.
Page revised: 16 June 2012
