by Ted Meighen
Toronto, Ontario
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Stephen Clarkson, The Big Red Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005, 352 pages. ISBN: 0774811951, $85.00 (hardcover), ISBN: 077481196X, $24.95 (paperback).
With the recent defeat of the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) and the termination of its lengthy rule over Canada, it may be time to examine some of the reasons why the party of Laurier, King, St. Laurent, Trudeau, Chrétien, and Martin continues to strike such a chord with Canadians. Indeed, eighty of the past one hundred and ten years have seen Grits occupying 24 Sussex. University of Toronto professor Stephen Clarkson offers some reasons why.
On the whole, The Big Red Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics is well researched, with ample and generous footnotes, and a hefty bibliography. Taking a chronological approach, the book traces the early history of the LPC, examines Trudeau’s triumphant win in the 1974 election, continues through his fall in 1979 and John Turner’s meteoric rise in the mid 1980s. It finishes up with an examination of the latest—and one of the longest periods—of Liberal dominance, lead by Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin and the four elections they have fought. In total, some nine different elections between 1974 and 2004 are discussed and examined in various constituent parts such as: party strategy, party finances, the impact of advertising, how various Liberal leaders performed, impact(s) of both media coverage and leaders’ debates, and finally, the results. Clarkson does a solid job at convincing readers that the fundamental and overarching reason why the LPC has been so successful, is its ability to straddle the political spectrum; all the while presenting itself to the Canadian public as the party of moderation, inclusion and more recently, economic success. Looking ahead, “it would take a disaster far greater than the sponsorship scandal” Clarkson concludes, to cause a collapse in Liberal fortunes.
Clarkson points toward various “party systems” and the LPC ability to be “dominant in each of these … party systems” as one piece of evidence of its government juggernaut. Beginning with a “clientelistic approach” under Laurier, the party system then evolved into the “brokerage” system of the 1920s, ‘30s and ‘40s. The 1950s saw the emergence of a “pan-Canadian system”, which would last until the 1990s. The 1993 election—categorized by Clarkson as an “electoral earthquake … which fragmented the Canadian party system”—saw the emergence of regional politics (in a four party-system), whereby various groups championed regional issues and concerns. Clarkson further suggests that the inherent “electoral system bias” built into the first-past-the-post system, has chiefly benefited the Liberals.
Indeed, despite “an appetite for change”, Paul Martin won the 2004 election, more as a result of “the voters” overriding concern about the incumbent’s rival. Today, (thankfully) that appetite for change is even more pronounced, and there is (finally) evidence to suggest that the Canadian public is warming to the other alternatives.
While, as stated, Clarkson does a good job at making his case and while it is hard to find issues with which to criticize his thesis, Clarkson does spend a lot of time examining and analyzing factors which could be characterized as internal to the Liberal Party itself. A by no means exhaustive list includes: party finances, campaign organization, and leader’s performance during each campaign, as well as the nature of internal Liberal democracy or leadership selection. While important, such a focus is, I feel, misplaced. What would make a stronger and even more convincing argument is if the spotlight was shifted away from these “internal” party factors and more towards “external ones”, namely how the nature of Canadians themselves help shape political fortunes. The success or failure of any political party—let alone the Liberal Party—has less do to with how party members feel, how the national executive is organized, and how party campaign strategy operates, and directly more to do with the nature and personality of Canadians themselves. It is likely that while internal party factors/dynamics influence those who are active members, the internal mechanics of the party machinery is not as important during an election campaign. Indeed many more people vote in elections than are card-carrying members of any political party, Liberals included.
Consider the following, but by no means exhaustive list of “external factors”, which are arguably more important in determining success/failure: we are, on the whole, a moderate people. “Small l”, liberal policies such as adoption of same-sex marriage, a predisposition for supporting/favouring peacekeeping, multi-lateral operations and track-two diplomacy, no death penalty, and an our open, inclusive and highly integrated multi-cultural society, while conversely shunning fringe or extremist policies, are traditional hallmarks of Canadians. While fluctuations in these views appear influenced by events of the day—most recently in the aftermath of the summer of gun violence experienced in Toronto in 2005 whereby new polls show greater support for longer prison terms—is it surprising that Canadians elect the party which claims the majority of the centrist ground? Politicians and political parties whom we feel best exemplify our values attract us. Moreover this support is fluid. Indeed, if and when Liberal leaders do not engage the Canadian public—as explained in Clarkson’s chapter on Trudeau’s 1979 electoral loss—we have few qualms of voting in alternative (Conservative) governments. Clarkson points out that Mulroney himself was seen as “more liberal”, than his opponent.
Second, we are also a nation of immigrants—according to the latest government figures, some twenty percent of our total population was born outside Canada, with many more being born to first generation Canadians. Government figures report that some 235,000 people came to live in Canada in 2004. Indeed many of today’s voters—and indeed their children—have become Canadians during Liberal governments. The riding of Markham-Witchchurch- Stouville is typical of this. According to Election Canada figures, immigrants make up some sixty percent of the population. In the past five elections—stretching back to 1987—the Liberal candidate has garnered, on average, forty-two percent more votes than their nearest rivals, the Tories. A cursory, non-scientific examination of four other highly immigrant (at least ten percent)—as opposed to first generation Canadians—ridings in Québec and Nova Scotia reveal similar patterns. It is only natural to think that whichever party was in power during the immigration booms of the last century would then benefit. One cannot help but feel however that if positions were reversed—and a Conservative government were in power during these times—the benefactors of this electoral support may very well have been different.
Third is the nature of the public’s perception, a factor which is touched upon in this book, but not in nearly as prominently a way as it should have been. Indeed, our perceptions of various candidates, our feelings regarding the leaders themselves and the parties they lead probably have more impact on the success or failure of any given party than how much money they have. The poor performances of the Reform and Canadian Alliance parties in the 1990s were a result of being unable to convince voterich Ontario and Québec that they were right for Canada. Indeed, one only has to look at Conservative fortunes in the 1993 election. Clarkson himself concludes that Liberals were successful in the 2000 election because they proved to be “masters of responding to the electorates’ broad desire for balance and moderation.”
In short, what Clarkson focuses upon are the internal circumstances of a political party—political campaign themes, election financing or internal democracy/autocracy. These however, are not nearly as important reasons for success as compared to external ones—public perception, and/or demographic makeup and background of the voting public. If anything, internal factors come as a result of how a party is perceived by the public, since after all it is the public who make up party membership.
Finally, Clarkson’s contention that it would take “a disaster greater” than the sponsorship scandal is denied by the irrefutable gains that the Conservatives have made in the recent election, both in Ontario and elsewhere. As noted, after years in the political wilderness, the new and revitalized Conservative party is showing that it is being listened to and, more importantly, accepted by more and more Canadians. The party, its leader and its polices have logically evolved to fit the Canada of the 21st Century. Regionalization, which was so much a reason of all the vote splitting—and of Liberal success—in the 1990s and early 2000s, is gone. Traditional Liberal strongholds in Québec and the West continue to be eaten away. It is now not a question of not whether the Liberals can survive another scandal, but how much the sponsorship business (and other happenings) ruined their chances of forming a fifth consecutive government. In this context, the future appears very bleak indeed.
On balance Dr. Clarkson’s book is an engaging account of why we are governed the way we are. While I feel he does not necessarily focus on the most important reasons for why the LPC is so successful, his general conclusions, with one exception, sits well with this Progressive Conservative.
The Liberal machine. Sir Wilfrid Laurier with Joseph Cusson and bodyguards on a train at Somerset, Manitoba, 1910.
Source: Archives of Manitoba, Somerset 24, provided by La Société historique de Saint-Boniface.Page revised: 24 April 2011
