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Manitoba History: Red River’s Anglophone Community: The Conflicting Views of John Christian Schultz and Alexander Begg

by Grant W. Grams
Concordia University College of Alberta, Edmonton

Number 64, Fall 2010

Source: Archives of Manitoba, Personalities - Begg, Alexander #1, N21681.

Source: Archives of Manitoba, Personalities - Schultz, J. C. #6, N10485.

Alexander Begg (1839-1897), left, and John Christian Schultz (1840-1896), right, were influential members of the Anglophone community of the Red River Settlement.

When the Dominion of Canada was formed on 1 July 1867, the Fathers of Confederation were already casting an expansionist eye westward to Rupert’s Land and the North-western territory. The Red River Colony at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine rivers served as a convenient gateway to future development, wealth and adventure, as well as a potential source of raw materials. It was also militarily and strategically important to the fledgling country’s security as the idea of expansion formed parts of sections 90, 91 and 146 of the British North America (BNA) Act. The annexation of the settlement may have seemed inevitable to Canadians in the East, but many people in the Red River settlement were sharply divided over the issue. It was not only the Métis who were worried; so also were the Anglophones in the community.

This article examines events in the Red River settlement prior to the formation of Manitoba in 1870 as seen through the eyes of two members of the Red River Anglophone community, John Christian Schultz (1840–1896) and Alexander Begg (1825–1905). Both men resided in the Red River community and their contemporary publications will be used to present contrasting views of the future of the Red River settlement before its appropriation. Schultz’s view represented the central-Canadian annexationist viewpoint as expressed in his newspaper The Nor’Wester. In contrast, Begg represented a moderate local viewpoint within the Red River Colony. The article will focus on the conflicting ideals of these two men; it will not examine the views of other ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural groups.

Red River was under the administration of the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), a British trading company chartered in 1670 to trade furs with the native peoples of North America. The HBC had nominal control over this area. Only in the Red River was there an established community. As the diverse community grew in size, governing the settlement became increasingly difficult.

Through time the Red River settlement had evolved and was made up of five main communities—French- and English-speaking Métis, Scottish, French, and First Nations. The Métis communities were partly composed of aboriginal peoples who had settled on river lots within the settlement. Each of these ethnic settlements was a distinct community of separate origin and individual character. This population was diverse—divided by race, religion and rank. Despite these differences the settlements had a definite character united by common factors: the isolation of the area, the fur trade, plains hunt, riverfront agriculture and the frequency of Aboriginal family interactions. The entire Red River settlement represented a delicate community that was periodically divided by internal factionalism and the interference of outsiders. [1]

Since the 1840s individuals from central Canada had argued for Red River’s annexation, and the possibility of Canada stretching from sea to sea was discussed amongst members of the British-Canadian administration. An essential first step was the annexation of the Red River settlement. These sentiments gained momentum and support through time only as Canadian imperialists inside the Red River argued in favour of this action. For others in the Red River settlement, being part of Canada could be detrimental to their future as terms and conditions would be dictated by eastern Canadians. [2] Although both Schultz and Begg came from central Canada, they agreed on few matters concerning the future of Red River.

Alexander Begg arrived in Red River from Ontario in 1867. He traded in manufactured goods in the settlement from 1867 until 1877, becoming a local businessman, teacher, civil servant, writer, historian and journalist. Begg’s moderate view of events unfolding in Red River caused him to question the actions of the Canadian government; he was sympathetic to the local Hudson’s Bay Company administration. [3]

John Schultz moved to the Red River Settlement from Ontario in 1859. He was a businessman and speculator in the area, eventually owning a number of stores in the colony’s business sector. Schultz became part-owner of The Nor’Wester newspaper in 1864, and its full owner the following year. The newspaper was a pro-British-Canadian publication advocating Canada’s control of the Red River and was traditionally hostile to the HBC’s administration. [4] Schultz was a bitter opponent of the HBC and, as the only newspaper editor in the colony, he described it consistently in negative terms. He sold The Nor’Wester in 1868, but remained involved in the region’s blossoming newspaper culture.

Schultz was initially on good terms with Red River’s Francophone community, but his questionable business practices made him unpopular with most established settlers, Anglophone and Francophone alike. He and his followers were viewed with suspicion by most of Red River’s Métis community. By 1869, Schultz had emerged as the leader of a small, ultra-Protestant organization, which promoted the annexation of Red River by the Canadian government, while encouraging Anglophone, Protestant immigration from Ontario. [5] Schultz was a member of the Canada First Party, an annexationist group, and while not representing all central Canadians, it represented the interests of many Ontarians. These men dreamed of expansion and speculation. [6]

Historian Doug Owram describes a subscription to The Nor’Wester as a “badge of membership in the campaign for annexation.” [7] George Denison, a founder of the Canada First Party, stated that its followers would “do all we could to advance the interests of our native land.” He described Schultz as “a loyal and patriotic Canadian. He had been persecuted by the Hudson’s Bay officials. Once he was put in prison by them, but was soon taken out by a mob of the [Red River] inhabitants.” Schultz was later described as “an able man of great courage and strength of character, as well as sound judgement.” Denison encouraged Canadian Prime Minister John A. Macdonald to annex the Red River in order to make Canada a large and prosperous country. The men involved in the Canada First group vowed “we would put our country first, before all personal, political or party considerations … the true interest of Canada was to be first in our minds on every occasion.” [8]

Macdonald, although favourable to the notion of expansion, was not fond of Schultz. He described him as “a clever sort of man but exceedingly cantankerous and ill conditioned.” [9] Modern historians agree with Macdonald’s assessment. Pannekoek describes Schultz as being “extremely abrasive.” [10] Morton depicts Schultz as “determined to open the north-west to Canadian settlement.” [11]

Begg described The Nor’Wester and those in favour of its Canadian expansionist ideology as alienating, rather than promoting annexation. [12] According to Begg, The Nor’Wester was “the organ of a few ambitious intriguing men in the settlement ... who, while working for a change in government, calculated upon a large benefit to themselves personally, without taking into account the welfare and condition of the settlers at all.” [13] Schultz tried to influence others to support Canadian expansion. He wrote:

I am penetrated, deeply penetrated with the importance which attaches to the integrity, high character, and literary reputation of our newspaper. But we are not only influenced here but judged abroad. For across our broad expanse of plains, dense woods—our hermit lakes—ah, who would not be a hermit amid such lakes to dwell—far across the mighty sea … there can be seen the lighthouse on the coast—the beacon that lets men know that we are here, a healthy seedling from a brave old tree. [14]

According to Begg, Schultz served as “a thorn in the side of the government officials at Red River. [15] Begg believed “The Nor’Wester had now become the mouthpiece of the malcontents in the settlement,” with its remarks being “so offensive that the majority of the people became disgusted with it.” [16]

The Nor’Wester published what it saw as desirable, often giving a one-sided account of events. Schultz confessed to using “every means in our power to further the advance of settlement and civilization throughout this vast domain, that we shall use every endeavor to reclaim this fair land from the hands of the [HBC] monopoly and the savage.” [17] Canadian control of Red River contrasted with the rule of First Nations and the HBC which, Schultz believed, were misgoverning the land.

Upper Fort Garry

Upper Fort Garry, at the confluence of the Assiniboine and Red Rivers, at it looked in the 1870s, seen in this reconstruction by Jules Perret, 1942.
Source: Archives of Manitoba, Fort Garry 19, N12506.

In contrast, Begg wanted the Red River to remain under HBC control; change was undesirable. If annexation to Canada was to occur, Begg believed, it had to take into account the wishes of the local inhabitants. [18]

Begg had experienced the pre-1870 Red River settlement as approaching utopia. [19] He described the Red River settlement as having all the “advantages of civilization”; the inhabitants were “tolerably virtuous and unmistakably happy.” But central Canadians incorrectly viewed the settlement as the “wild children of the prairie” needing the guidance of Canada. [20] There were individual examples of laws being broken which only supported Canadian propaganda. Such occurrences were “dished up in the endeavor to show the outside world that the settlers of Red River were groaning under an oppressive, tyrannical government.”

Begg was content that HBC rule gave the Red River a unique combination of isolation, independence and civilization, but Canada’s potential acquisition of the Red River caused deep concern for its inhabitants. [21] He contended that they had “an indisputable voice in the selection of the men appointed to watch over their interests.”

Traditionally the HBC would consult the settlers on local affairs that concerned them. It was a lie, fomented by central-Canadian expansionists, that the settlers had no control over their own affairs in order to justify possible annexation. Begg made the point that the local councillors from the Red River, and the HBC were equal in power. One member of the local board could overturn any motion. The settlers of the Red River were content but interests of “parties from abroad came to Red River and sowed the seeds of discontent amongst the inhabitants.” Traditionally relying on the peaceful and contented character of the people, the HBC feared stirring up “internal commotion” to settle local quarrels.

The administration of the Red River was intentionally misrepresented to portray the settlers as having no voice in local affairs, under the rule of a weak although sometimes overbearing HBC administration. Schultz frequently described the negotiations between Canadian and HBC officials and wanted all talks “pressed forward as rapidly as possible to a conclusion.” [22] The Nor’Wester published what it wanted; two constant themes were the inefficiency of the HBC administration, and the advantages the Red River would have when united with Canada. [23] Schultz stated that the local inhabitants didn’t like HBC rule because they were in a stagnant, subservient position—“the company have held a charter and exercised privileges by it for 200 years, including rights of government and legislation together with the prosperity of all the lands and precious metals.” [24] Schultz called this the “last great monopoly” while reassuring his readers that their misrule would soon end. [25]

Schultz wrote that vast quantities of gold were in the North-west with the “richest mines near the sources of the Saskatchewan [river]”. Schultz also believed that there was “no natural barrier to the physical union of the British North American colonies from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean,” the only obstacle being the claims of the HBC. Once these claims were extinguished the Red River would enjoy “a properly organized government, who can undertake the construction of roads, survey and lay out the land for settlement, and establish communication with Canada on one side and British Columbia on the other.” A union with Canada would improve the settlement by ending the HBC trading monopoly and provide a better administration. The “social and political character demand early attention,” wrote Schultz in The Nor’ Wester, in order to help free the locals from the HBC’s monopoly and oppression. [26]

In contrast Begg stated that “the Company were liberal supporters of the several religious denominations”. The HBC also helped out consistently in times of need; it was not oppressive or a poor administrator. The laws were mild, taxation light, land easily obtainable, and the HBC served as bankers and a market for locally produced goods. [27] Begg had no qualms with HBC control and maintained that some in central Canada incorrectly assumed the annexation of the Red River would save the local inhabitants from an oppressive HBC administration. [28]

On 4 December 1867, William McDougall, Minister of Public Works, introduced into the Canadian Parliament resolutions that reflected the central-Canadian attitude regarding the North-West. McDougall believed annexation would promote the prosperity of the Canadian people, and the entire British Empire. It aided Canada to extend west to the Pacific Ocean, encouraging the colonization of western lands and access to vital raw materials. Annexation would also promote the welfare of the local population through the implementation of Canadian institutions. [29] Central-Canadian expansionists and federal government imperialists had taken measures to “weaken the only existing Government at the time” while portraying the locals as “in want of proper protection.” [30]

With Canadian imperialists fomenting trouble in the area, the HBC found it did not have the necessary “money or force to carry out the laws”, resulting in serious negotiations between the Dominion of Canada and the HBC. Canada First Party founder George Denison praised Macdonald as demonstrating “farseeing leadership” during negotiations with the HBC. George-Étienne Cartier, a French Canadian political leader and one of the Fathers of Confederation, and William McDougall were sent to England to carry out negotiations. Denison also praised McDougall as a man who followed the “Canada First” ideology: “We knew he would do all that man could do to secure territory for Canada.” [31]

Begg found that the Red River settlement was confused during negotiations, not knowing what their future might be. [32] It was a time of many rumours and much apprehension. [33]

The Métis were already suspicious, having lost their lands in the United States, where Métis claims were never recognized. They feared the whole situation could occur north in Red River as well. Alexander Ross referred to these individuals as “chiefly half-breeds from Red River; many without house, home, or allegiance to any government—wanderers at large, citizens of the wilderness.” The terms of the Pembina Treaty of 1851—an attempt to negotiate Métis interests in Minnesota Territory in the face of US expansion—were a great disappointment to the Métis. They had struggled to establish a settlement in the belief they would be “recognized by the American government as the rightful owners of the disputed lands of Pembina.” [34]

The Métis in the Red River talked about looking after their own interests. The gossip and fears of the community only increased as two groups of men, the HBC and Canadian officials, were deciding their fate. Little thought was given to the local inhabitants. [35]

In contrast to Begg, Schultz portrayed the people of the Red River as anxious for change. Schultz believed the Red River colony was excited, and happy of the prospect of becoming part of Canada. [36] Schultz stressed that the Canadian government would not take anything away from the community, merely improve its prosperity while ending its isolation. [37] The Canadians, according to Schultz, did not want to uproot the way of life and sense of community in Red River, but to open “communication with the Red River through Canadian territory.” The Red River settlement was to advance and enjoy future prosperity through Canadian contact. [38] Schultz urged settlers to “facilitate the action of the Canadians.” [39]

For some Red River inhabitants, annexation by the United States was also a possibility. Both Schultz and Begg viewed this as unwanted, but for different reasons. Schultz presented Canada as the better country in an attempt to convince any skeptical readers, depicting the Americans as having a corrupt administration. [40] The Americans’ treatment of native peoples was also intentionally exaggerated by Schultz in order to justify his description of the United States as the “barbarians of the plains.” [41] According to Schultz the Canadian government was preferable for a number of reasons. One, there was a great risk that the colonists would lose their farms and homes due to the large American debt in the wake of the Civil War. Two, prices of common necessities would double or triple compared to prices in the Dominion. Three, taxation would greatly increase and “ruin the mass of our rural population,” with Schultz arguing that if the Red River became part of the United States taxes would be five times higher than with Canada, and high rates would increase yearly. Four, the Red River would “be forced to sacrifice free trade and adopt the most stringent system of protection or rather monopoly, known to any age.” Five, the possibility of European immigration would end due to the high taxation and cost of living. Last, in the event of war between the United States and Great Britain “we [Red River residents] would have to fight, kill, and plunder our English, Irish and Scottish brethren.” [42] Begg agreed on this one point with Schultz. He, too, saw the incorporation of the area into the United States as unwanted. The local life and autonomy between the ethnic groups on the Red River were fragile; annexation to the United States would infringe on this way of life. Begg stated that the Red River could join Canada but it would have to be “a just union.” The local residents preferred to remain as they were, under HBC administration, but if change had to occur, Canada was the lesser of two evils. Begg maintained that annexation to the United States “will not be for the good of the present settlers” because the “class of settlers that will flow in here from the States will not be of the kind we require—and the Americans as a rule are not the people to care much for the condition and interests of the people now here.” He believed that annexation by Canada would be the better solution, but “if not Canada let us stick to the old ‘Union Jack’. [43]

The major Anglophone groups in the Red River had separate fears and motives for their affiliations. Americans tended to back annexation by the United States, those from the United Kingdom and those individuals who benefitted from the current HBC administration, such as Begg, wanted no change. Those from central Canada or those who believed in the “Canada First” ideology, such as Schultz, saw Canadian annexation as the most advantageous option for the Red River. [44] The balance in the community was very delicate; the common denominators were based on their isolation and native ties. But the social tensions throughout the multiracial society on the Red River escalated due to changing economic trends in the community and central-Canadian imperialist interests. The Canadian government exploited these divisions for their own purposes. [45]

The Canadian government was anxious to control the Red River from the time negotiations began until Manitoba became a Canadian province. The only competitor to annexation was the United States. John A. Macdonald wrote, “it is quite evident to me … that the United States Government are resolved to do all they can, short of war, to get possession of the western territory and we must take immediate and vigorous steps to counteract them.” [46]

Schultz believed that the United States was jealous of the increased power and prosperity of Canada. Soon the American imperialist “in Washington [will] take measures to acquire this country by fair means or foul; and instead of stating the truth in this matter, they must resort to misrepresentation and falsehood.” [47] According to Oscar Malmros, the American Consul in Red River, “the entire French, and over one-half of the other inhabitants are strongly opposed to annexation to Canada, the rest, with the exception of perhaps a couple dozen of Canadian partisans, are possibly indifferent.” The American government also noted that “the Nor’Wester, as yet the only paper published in the Red River settlements, is in the interest of the Canadian government, and for some months past has been misrepresenting the actual conditions of the Territory-representing this rising of people as the act of a few ignorant half-breeds, when, in fact, it is well known here that the Red River people, of all nationalities, are united almost to a man.” If the settlement was to have its wishes, the American government “anticipate[d] a strong and determined movement in favor of annexation to the United States.” If Red River was to become part of Canada, it was the Americans desire that this be “the result of a peaceful adjustment among the people interested.” [48]

While both Schultz and Macdonald displayed a fear of the United States, this interpretation was in sharp contrast to Begg. Riel, who Canadian expansionists accused of favouring America’s expansion, was against any quick annexation, especially by the Americans. Riel was in control of the Red River community by 1869; Begg believed his actions showed “honest purpose for the good of his country—the American influence is no influence with him.” For Begg, the influence of the Americans in the community was minimal; the fear of annexation almost nonexistent. Begg knew that there was little to fear from the Americans as they had no authority in the area. Americans occupied only a few positions within the Red River administration. [49]

Modern historians, such as James Snell, agree with Begg; there was no fear of American annexation. Snell examined American sources and believed that Macdonald’s accusation that the American government was ready to do anything short of war to annex Red River was incorrect. He believed that US President Grant showed restraint and maturity. He concluded that the Canadian government under Macdonald found it “advantageous to their national purpose to portray a somewhat one-sided view of American reactions. [50]

The outcome of negotiations between the HBC and Canada saw the North West ceded to Canada on 1 December 1869. [51] In return, three hundred thousand pounds were paid to the HBC, and the Company would retain its forts surrounded by small tracts of land.

According to Begg, during the negotiations the Canadian government represented the Red River inhabitants “as only a few employees of the Hudson Bay Company and a number of Indian tribes.” [52] When the settlers in the area voiced their concern about the future administration, their questions were ignored. Begg stated that “the necessity for a change of Government was forced upon the people by the acts of a few men who afterwards made it a boast that the natives of the country would have to give way before the incoming stranger.” [53]

Red River settlers became increasingly worried about their fate. They issued public proclamations stating that inhabitants of Red River were law-abiding. Local residents wanted a just union that would “secure the welfare of the natives and inhabitants of this settlement.” [54] They wanted to ensure their rights would be respected, and that they not be treated as a subject people. The interests of Ontario seemed to be the priority as the local interests were largely ignored. [55]

The Canadians incorrectly believed that anarchy reigned in the Red River and the inhabitants needed stability and protection. [56] The Canadian government lacked knowledge of the area and an understanding of the current administration. [57] These sources reveal an arrogant and uniformed administration that alienated the Red River settlers. Yet the Canadians claimed they only wanted to help the locals and calm the uninformed while taking measures to put the area under federal control. This meant abolishing all local forms of administration, and allowing the Canadian government and institutions to be established.

The Red River area was to be a colony of Canada subject to the whims of a people who knew little about their administration or lifestyle. [58] Councillors representing the settlers would be appointed in the new administration to demonstrate the settlers had a voice, but in a ratio favouring Canada. [59] Canadians would be in charge to do as they saw fit. For the locals, this meant their voices would go unheard, their complaints ignored. [60] In his letter of 3 November 1869, J. Provencher, an aide to Macdonald, stated that Canadians would rule the area, but would try to appear lenient with the Red River settlers. Attempts would be made to appear conciliatory regarding locals wishes. [61]

A view of the Point Douglas neighborhood of Winnipeg, looking north from the top of the Court House, August 1875. Foundations for the new city market are visible in the foreground.
Source: City of Winnipeg Archives

When Lieutenant-Governor McDougall, who had been appointed Governor of Red River, attempted to enter the Red River on 16 November 1869, two weeks before the area was to be ceded to Canada, Louis Riel’s Métis followers refused to allow him to enter.

Schultz believed any attempt to not allow Canadian officials into the Red River area showed hatred for Canada and “disloyalty to the Queen.” [62] He thought that only irrational, uninformed people did not see the obvious advantages of annexation to Canada. Those who were not in favour were misrepresenting the nature of the transfer, and the intentions of the Canadian government regarding the rights of locals. [63] Yet Schultz argued the current government was “ruled by Indian laws and savages” and that interest by the Canadians was appreciated and desired. [64] For Schultz the Canadian government could do little wrong.

Begg, on the other hand, saw the denial of access to McDougall as a means to ensure a just union. Their actions were not meant as a sign of disloyalty or aggression but it strengthened the locals’ position in future interactions with the Canadians. [65] Begg saw the Dominion of Canada as “having an eye to the North-West for some years past”, willing to use “any statement that tends to show us in the light of a down trodden people, because it will assist them in their demands” in acquiring the area. [66] Begg stated that McDougall behaved inappropriately when he came into contact with the Métis. They wanted to be treated as equals, not as subordinates. By denying McDougall access to the area, proper terms could be awarded to all locals. They believed once McDougall was inside the community the Métis’ position of strength regarding negotiations would be lost. [67]

J. J. Hargrave, an HBC employee, was anti-Métis, but acknowledged that the Canadians had their own agenda. They did not respect the present administration or traditions and acted in an arrogant manner. The appointment of McDougall was premature as some of the problems in the Red River were due to the meddling influence of outsiders. [68]

Another problematic action by the Canadians, before negotiations with the HBC had been concluded, was the sending of surveyors to the Red River. [69] According to historian John O’Donnel, the “survey bisected the lots in many places, and in some instances passed through their buildings, or left their buildings on their neighbour’s farm.” [70] This alarmed all locals but the Canadians did not recall the surveyors or try to quell the residents’ fears. The Canadian policy was one of ignorance; the surveyors were a premature act of adventure and speculation. [71]

For Schultz, the actions of the surveyors were merely to ensure the transaction between the HBC and Canada went smoothly with the Red River benefitting by the building of a road, resulting in increased communication and commerce. [72]

Overall, the central-Canadian government acted in a high-handed and arrogant manner. Canadians made false assumptions that the protests coming out of the Red River were only those of a handful of Métis. They argued that the white settlers and English-speaking Métis were against Riel and his followers, and were in favour of Canadian involvement. The Canadian government, according to Begg, made only one serious attempt to communicate with the Red River inhabitants and address grievances. But this was after many Canadian blunders had occurred; no further attempts at communication were made. [73] Many Canadians believed the colony spoke through Schultz; therefore, consultation with the inhabitants of the Red River was not needed. This assumption alienated the bulk of the settlers and infuriated the Métis population. [74]

Since they had purchased the area from the HBC, central Canadians believed they could use the area as they saw fit. Red River was to be a colony of central Canada; the old elite and administration would be removed only to be replaced with people from Ontario.

The Canadian government viewed Red River in terms of its potential. Prior to the passing of the Manitoba Act, the Canadian government had already made plans to send “in a military force to restore peace and order,” showing the Canadians had little intention of serious discussions with the locals within the Red River. [75]

On 2 May 1870, the Province of Manitoba was formed. Schultz clearly won the war of words with Begg, but the way the annexation was handled resulted in grievances among the Red River settlers that continue to echo to this day.


1. E. E. Rich, London Correspondence Inward from Eden Colville 1849-1852. London: The Hudson’s Bay Record Society, 1956, pp. xiv-xxiv; Joseph Doutre, Constitution of Canada. Montreal: John Lovell and Son, 1880, pp. 114-206, 380-382.

2. Frits Pannekoek, “Some Comments on the Social Origins of the Riel Protest of 1869”, in Potyondi, B. (ed.) Transactions of the Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba. Winnipeg: Hignell Printing Limited 1978, p. 40.

3. Frits Pannekoek, A Snug Little Flock: the Social Origins of the Riel Resistance 1869-70. Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer Publishing, 1991, pp. 215-216; W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History. University of Toronto Press, 1957, p. 110.

4. A. Garland, “The Nor’Wester and the Men who established it”, in D. Kemp (ed.), Transactions of the Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba. Winnipeg: Hignell Printing Limited, 1961, p. 8.

5. Rich, pp. lxvii-lxviii; J. M. Bumsted, Reporting the Resistance: Alexander Begg and Joseph Hargrave on the Red River Resistance. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2003 p. 276; Doug Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the idea of the West, 1856-1900. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, pp. 63-64. Owram has Schultz arriving in 1859, Morton in 1860.

6. J. M. Bumsted, Trials and Tribulations: The Red River Settlement and the Emergence of Manitoba 1811-1870. Winnipeg: Great Plains Publications, 2003, pp. 210-211; F. Pannekoek, “The Anglican Church and the Disintegration of the Red River Society, 1818-1870”, in J. M. Bumsted, (ed.), Interpreting Canada’s Past, Vol. 1, p. 284. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986.

7. Owram, p. 83.

8. George Denison, The Struggle for Imperial Unity. Toronto: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1909, p. 11-19.

9. Joseph Pope (ed.), Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 106.

10. Pannekoek, 1978, pp. 49-50.

11. W. L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972, pp. 333-334.

12. D. Owram, Promise of Eden. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, pp. 81-82; W. L. Morton, The Critical Years: The Union of British North America 1857-1873. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964, p. 242.

13. Alexander Begg, The Creation of Manitoba, or A History of the Red River Troubles. Toronto, 1871, p. 108.

14. The Nor’Wester, 28 November 1864.

15. Begg, History of the North-West, p. 349.

16. Begg, Ibid., pp. 349-363.

17. The Nor’Wester, 28 July 1868.

18. Begg, The Creation of Manitoba, p. 25.

19. Doug Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, pp. 208-209.

20. Alexander Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, Winnipeg: Times Priniting and Publishing House, 1879, pp. 6-7.

21. Alexander Begg, Dot it Down. Toronto: Hunter, Rose, and Co., 1871, pp. 234-243.

22. The Nor’Wester, 13 June 1868.

23. Garland, p. 12.

24. The Nor’Wester, 20 June 1868.

25. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, A. H. Hovey Toronto, 1871, pp. 14-15.

26. The Nor’Wester, 13 July 1867.

27. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, pp. 10-11.

28. Begg 1871, p. 6.

29. Alexander Begg, History of the North-West, Hunter, Rose, and Co. Ltd., Toronto 1894, pp. 342-343.

30. Begg, A History of Red River Troubles, pp.1-13; Begg, Ten Years in Winnipeg, pp. 6-10.

31. Denison, p. 13.

32. Begg, Red River Journal and Other Papers Relative to the Red River Resistence of 1869-1870, The Champlain Society Toronto 1956, pp. 217-221.

33. Macoun, J., Manitoba and the Great North West, The World Publishing Company Guelph 1882, pp. 460-461.

34. Ross, Alexander, The Red River Settlement, Smith, Elder and Co., London 1856, pp. 403-412.

35. The Nor’Wester, 14 December 1867.

36. The Nor’Wester, 25 August 1868.

37. The Nor’Wester, 27 March 1869.

38. The Nor’Wester, 1 May 1869.

39. The Nor’Wester, 18 July 1868.

40. Garland, pp. 14-15; The Nor’Wester, 14 November 1868.

41. The Nor’Wester, 12 January 1869.

42. The Nor’Wester, 17 April 1869.

43. The Nor’Wester, 3 July 1869.

44. Pannekoek, Some Comments, p. 39.

45. Pannekoek, “The Anglican Church” pp. 273-274.

46. Pope, p. 124.

47. The Nor’Wester, 29 March 1868.

48. USA: Affairs on the Red River, Oscar Malmros, United States Consul to J. C. B. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, 11 September 1869, in Message of the President of the United States communicating, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate of 8 December 1869, information relating to the presence of the honorable William McDougall at Pembina, in Dakota Territory, and the opposition by the inhabitants of Selkirk settlement to his assumption of the office of governor of the Northwest Territory, Senate executive document (United States. Congress. Senate) 41st Congress, 2nd Session, no. 33, Washington, 1870, No.1, pp. 2-8.

49. Begg, Red River Journal, pp. 254-259.

50. Snell, James, “American Neutrality and the Red River Resistance 1869-1870,” Prairie Forum, Vol. 4 No. 2 Fall 1979, pp. 183-185.

51. Begg, Red River Journal, pp. 221-223, 253-257.

52. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, p. 15.

53. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, pp. 44-46.

54. Begg, Alexander, Dot it Down, Hunter, Rose, Toronto, 1871, pp. 234-239.

55. Macoun, pp. 435-455.

56. Denison, p. 26.

57. Pope, J., Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald, Oxford University Press Toronto 1965, p. 95.

58. Government of Canada, Correspondence and Papers Connected with Recent Occurrences in the North-West Territories, I. B. Taylor 1870, pp. 23-27.

59. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, p. 16.

60. Government of Canada, Correspondence and Papers Connected with Recent Occurrences in the North-West Territories, I. B. Taylor 1870, pp. 44-46.

61. Government of Canada, Correspondence and Papers Connected with Recent Occurrences in the North-West Territories, I. B. Taylor 1870, pp. 27-28.

62. The Nor’Wester, 29 October 1869.

63. Begg, Red River Journal, p. 254.

64. The Nor’Wester, 18 August 1868.

65. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, p. 25.

66. Begg, Dot it Down, p. 107.

67. Begg, Red River Journal, pp. 244-254.

68. Bumsted, J. M. (ed.): Reporting the Resistance Alexander Begg and Joseph Hargrave on the Red River Resistance, University of Manitoba Press 2003, pp. 20-23.

69. Government of Canada, Correspondence and Papers Connected with Recent Occurrences in the North-West Territories, I. B. Taylor 1870, p. 9.

70. O’Donnel, John, Manitoba as I Saw It, The Musson Book Company Toronto 1909, pp. 28-29.

71. Begg, A History of the Red River Troubles, pp. 24-27.

72. The Nor’Wester, 18 August 1868, 28 August 1869.

73. Begg, History of the North-West, p. 422.

74. Owram, p. 84.

75. Begg, History of the North-West, Vol. II pp. 15-16.

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